| Annotation: | Methods. The study of models of contractual behavior of economic entities is based on the theoretical and methodological foundations of neo-institutional theory, namely: the theory of the firm, transaction costs, the theory of organizations. Specific methods being used in the study were the following: logical-and-historical method – while analyzing the evolution of views on the process of contracting; general and specific – while highlighting the specifics of different types of agreements; classification – while creating a typology of contracts. Results. The study of the evolution of contract theory as a component of modern theory of industry markets is conducted. The factors that determine the existence of various forms of contracting are identified. Particular attention is paid to the consideration of such factor as specific assets, its impact on the formation of the bargaining power of contracting parties is shown. The specific features of classical, neoclassical contracts and the contract of relations, which is a form of implicit contracts, are highlighted. The role of informal norms in concluding a contract of relations is demonstrated. The process of concluding a contract, which defines the rights and obligations of the parties, as well as measures for liability for non-fulfillment of obligations, is considered in terms of transaction costs and, in particular, opportunistic behavior. Novelty. On the basis of the generalization of theoretical statements of the theory of contracts, the directions of solving the problem of choosing the optimal method of contracting by a firm operating in a market environment are outlined. Practical value. Typology of contracts, as well as analysis of models of contractual behavior, which depends on the choice of a particular type of agreement, allow making effective management decisions at the level of a particular firm, as well as reducing society's transaction costs at the level of national economy. |
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