| Annotation: | The article reveals the theoretical and methodological basis of the study of economic and political-economic interests in the scientific analysis of the representatives of the new institutionalism, of the developers of the theory of agency relations, of the theory of public choice, as well as of the new political economy. It is shown that the new political economy, based on an interdisciplinary analysis, supplemented the economic studies of the interests of the subjects and proved that the individual interests of the authorities prevail over the public interests and determine its economic policy and rationality of the behavior of the subjects of the political-economic process. Politics and individual interests of the authorities directly influence the economic results of other subjects through existing political decision-making mechanisms, among which the main ones are lobbying and logrolling mechanisms, political incentives for voters and the realization of their interests, the realization of the interests of the most influential pressure groups based on political leverage, through direct rent-oriented behavior of the authorities, aimed at finding and obtaining political and bureaucratic rent. Therefore, politics is a market process based on the exchange of specific property rights, namely: the rights of voters to elect representatives to state bodies, the rights of deputies to pass laws, the rights of officials to enforce them, etc. It is pointed out that contradictions of interests of politicians, voters and officials, and political-economic relations between them become the basis of a real political process, the consequences of which can be losses of society, “state failures”, the imperfection of political and economic transformation, business and electoral cycles. The solution of the problem connected with the increase of the effectiveness of interaction and the realization of the interests of the subjects of political and economic relations should be carried out taking into account methodological innovations in the areas of economics. |
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