Economic Bulletin of the National Mining University

 

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Issue:2026 №2 (94)
Section:International relations
UDK:339.5:339.9:327.5
DOI:https://doi.org/10.33271/ebdut/94.060
Article language:Ukrainian
Pages:60-73
Title:Geopolitical risk as a factor of supply chain transformation: analysis of Central and Eastern European countries
Authors:Mykhailyshyn L. I., Vasyl Stefanyk Carpathian National University,
Hrynchutskyi V. I., Vasyl Stefanyk Carpathian National University,
Zakharova O. V., Vasyl Stefanyk Сarpathian National University
Annotation:Methods. A data panel was formed for 12 countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine) for 2015–2024. The following were used: the GPR geopolitical risk index [1], the GSCPI global supply chain pressure index [2], UN Comtrade data on imports by partner countries and critical commodity groups (HS 27, 31, 72, 84, 85), and macroeconomic indicators of the World Bank. The Herfindahl–Hirschman concentration index (HGI), the share of critical imports, Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients were calculated, and a comparative analysis was conducted «before/after» February 2022. Results. The average value of the IGG import for the region is 731 (range 439–1051), which corresponds to the low concentration zone. Ten out of twelve countries reduced import concentration over the study period. The correlation of IGG with GPR on annual aggregates is –0.366, with GSCPI – –0.488: the increase in risk is accompanied not by concentration, but by diversification. The group of countries with a high share of critical imports (over 40%) reduced IGG by 8.6% after the 2022 shock, while the less vulnerable group reduced it by only 0.9%. Panel regression with fixed country effects confirmed the significance of the impact of logistical pressure on import diversification (β = –7.600; p = 0.084). Two types of reactions were identified: large economies of the region (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary) are actively diversifying, while small open economies (Slovenia, Latvia) are concentrating. Novelty. For the first time, geopolitical and logistical sources of risk were synchronously compared with indicators of geographical concentration of imports for 12 CEE countries. The effect of “reactive diversification” was identified: in contrast to the expected concentration, countries are expanding the circle of partners, and most actively - those with the highest vulnerability to critical imports. Practical value. The findings make it possible to calibrate supply diversification strategies with an emphasis on critical product groups and justify the need to develop industry vulnerability indicators. 
Keywords:Geopolitical risk, Supply chains, Import concentration, Herfindahl-Hirschman index, Central and Eastern Europe, Critical imports, Diversification, Trade shock, Resilience, War in Ukraine, Supply risk management
File of the article:EV20262_060-073.pdf
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